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Challenging the techno-politics of anonymity: the case of 
cryptomarket users 
Abstract: 
Anonymity is treated as a problem of governance that can be subject to technical resolution. 
We use the example of the darknet to critically examine this approach. We explore the 
background assumptions that have been made about anonymity as a quality of social life. We 
conceive of anonymity as a way of engaging and maintaining social relationships in an 
anonymous mode. We draw on a study of darknet ‘cryptomarket’ users who mainly use the 
darknet to buy and sell illicit drugs, discuss drug quality and share information on safe and 
effective use. We identify the personal satisfaction that comes from interacting anonymously 
online, the challenges this represents for maintaining trusted interactions and how they are 
overcome, and the combination of technology and action involved in maintaining anonymity. 
We argue that attempts to promote de-anonymising norms and technology are based on an 
erroneous understanding of what anonymity is. 
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 How is anonymity understood and generated in online communities that place a premium 
on being hidden? The changing salience of anonymity online has recently sparked concerns 
about, on the one hand, loss of privacy and autonomy in the face of state and corporate 
surveillance and, on the other, the creation of ungovernable spaces and the facilitation of 
terrorism and harassment. We argue that, in part, this debate involves some limiting 
assumptions about what anonymity is and what it means. Public discussions still assume 
that anonymity is the norm on the internet when it is rare, and it is also assumed that the 
main threat to it comes from state entities, where it is mostly private companies that 
assemble de-anonymising technology (Froomkin, 2015). Partly the problem stems from 
assuming that there always can be a singular, direct connection between real world identity 
and online persona, and the tendency to reduce the issue to scapegoated technologies and 
platforms (Scott, 2004). This reduces political questions to technical ones, and obscures how 
technical and social infrastructures are created in ways that de-anonymise.  
We aim to contribute to this debate by critically exploring these assumptions and reflecting 
on the history of treating anonymity as both productive and suspect, and by drawing on 
critical digital sociology that exposes the deep technological and social structuring of digital 
life (Beer & Burrows, 2013; Skeggs & Yuill, 2015). We study a case of anonymity in practice, 
how it is enacted and performed in darknet ‘cryptomarkets’. We use our case to challenge 
the current political representation of anonymity as inherently deceitful or harmful. We 
show how cryptomarket users create anonymity and use it as a resource that enables 
market interactions and allows for useful exchange of knowledge about drug consumption 
techniques, quality and safety. We outline our understanding of anonymity as embedded in 
online communities of practice, enterprises where shared knowledge and activity are 
emphasized over shared identity (Hobbs, 2013).  Our claim is that market users assemble 
various technologies, some of which are designed for anonymising and some that are not, 
along with anonymising practices in order to operate freely on the darknet. 
Anonymity can be framed in various ways: as a threat to predictable and coherent social 
order (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009), an unavoidable and normal feature of daily life (Natanson, 
1990), an intrinsic feature of private liberal citizenship (Froomkin, 1999), and a necessary 
condition of protest (Thompson, 1975). Historically, it has been assumed that anonymity is a 
fundamental part of the fabric of modernity with profound implications for social life. 
Sociology identified the emergence of anonymity as a feature of urban life (Simmel, 1903) 
and of a complex division of labour that necessarily involves working relationships between 
unknown others (Durkheim, 1893). As well as generating new forms of solidarity and self, it 
has also been presented as threatening social control, creating fleeting and passing 
interactions (Wirth, 1938) and indifference (Milgram, 1970), and leading to the creation of 
new forms of governance to defeat it such as surveillance assemblages (Haggerty & Ericson, 
2000). Some of the assumptions behind these claims have been challenged, such as that 
anonymity is a general quality of urbanising societies (Gans, 1962), or that it is an inherent 
quality arising out of certain settings and with definite potential to promote certain kinds of 
usually anti-social behaviour or alienated modes of living. We join this tradition, which 
challenges both anonymity’s supposedly a-social character and its naturalising as a 
technical-structural trait (Karp, 1973). We argue that in hidden communities anonymity is 
produced and shared as a requirement for them to function effectively.  
Some features of the early debate were reproduced in relation to historical development of 
the internet and social media. Early libertarian and feminist conceptions saw the severing of 
offline and online identities as freeing humans from the weight of real world restraints and 
oppressions (Barlow, 1996; Spender, 1995). The cypherpunk movement sought during the 
1980s and 1990s to embed a libertarian concept of cyberspace, developing cryptography 
and trust mechanisms that were intended to replace or resist central control and 
management and to substitute it with network-based systems (Branwen, 2015). The 
development of public encryption using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) by Phil Zimmerman was a 
key moment in this. Zimmerman was subject to a criminal investigation under the US Arms 
Control Export Act, high strength encryption being considered a military technology. 
Ensuring public encryption is available and usable is part of a political movement that has 
related tendrils such as the campaign to retain net neutrality. There is a ‘politics of code’ 
where struggles over concepts like privacy are embedded in software and technical 
processes. Promoting or weakening end-to-end encryption is an argument about both 
security and power (Hales, 2014). That is reflected in the various positions security agencies 
have come to in relation to encryption as a widespread security enhancing feature without 
which the modern, social internet would not be possible (Moore & Rid, 2016). 
Coinciding with the rise of social media, there has been a greater cultural and political focus 
on online anonymity as personally malign (UN Broadband Commission for Digital 
Development, 2015), supposedly promoting a range of damaging behaviours and stances 
from uncivil discourse to abuse (Reader, 2012). Political discourse in the UK, USA, China, 
Russia and India, among other countries, frames it as a shield and encouragement for 
terrorists, hackers, traffickers and trolls, people who post online in a deliberate attempt to 
damage individuals and online communities (Department of Electronics and Information 
Technology, 2015). Encryption has become the focus of some of these discussions as a 
problem technology. The Russian government has systematically tried to disrupt some 
anonymising systems whereas US government agencies been more circumspect and are 
constrained by unresolved legal questions (Çalışkan, Minárik, & Osula, 2015). These 
differences and disputes highlight the dual nature of the internet, both allowing counter-
publics to emerge and also opportunities for state and private domination through control 
of the data infrastructure (Garrett, 2006; Maddox, Barratt, Allen, & Lenton, 2016). 
Researchers have identified new orientations and identities coming into being on the 
internet such as crypto-freedom, which to an extent promotes an older vision of the 
internet as composed of self-reliant, technically proficient actors and peer generated 
communities (Beer & Burrows, 2010; Coleman & Golub, 2008). Many users respond with 
resignation to the brute fact of surveillance that is embedded in the infrastructure of the 
internet (Lee & Cook, 2015). It is technically and personally difficult for an individual to 
separate their real world identity and their online personae in order to maintain anonymity, 
even when it is experienced as a pressing use for them. 
We argue that focusing on particular technologies and on anonymity as a singular practice 
can be misleading. Anonymity can be broken down into different qualities that can be more 
suited to some activities and orientations than others (Pfitzmann & Hansen, 2010). Often it 
is used to mean pseudonymity, when individuals have a consistent, but disguised, persona. 
Multiple pseudonymous identities can be adopted to further obfuscate identity, to create 
desired effects through for example sock puppetry, creating multiple personae to give the 
impression of multiple support for one’s viewpoint, or to emphasise different roles and 
personas. De-linking separates different interactions by the same user and prevents them 
being connected by an outside agent. Undetectabilty disguises the content of hidden 
activity and unobservability the participants, such as the origin or recipient point of hidden 
communications. Ruppert et al (2013) usefully class digital social activity into actions and 
their traceability. Anonymity within the darknet preserves actions while it is intended to 
disrupt traceability. When we use the term anonymity here we use it to refer to the 
recognised state of being hidden, which includes these different aspects of anonymity, and 
then we use these more precise terms when picking out particular aspects of it. These 
different elements, though relevant, each describe a technical quality of anonymity. 
Previous research, not related to the darknet, into the nuances of anonymity on the internet 
has found a singular term to be left wanting because of the difference between a user being 
anonymous and them feeling anonymous (Kennedy, 2006, p. 870). Barratt’s (2011) 
distinction between ‘technical anonymity’ and ‘social anonymity’ allows for a better 
understanding of the different effects of anonymity. Technical anonymity exists when 
individuals are untraceable: there is no link between their actions and a singular identifiable 
and accountable persona. Social anonymity is the shared sense of operating anonymously.  
We take a case where the possibility of surveillance is keenly felt. The darknet is the set of 
relay systems and encryption protocols that disguise the origin, destination and/or the 
content of internet traffic. At the time of writing the most prominent of these is the The 
Onion Router (Tor) system. It was created by the US Naval Research Laboratory to enable 
secure government communications (Çalışkan et al., 2015). The darknet is often discussed 
as a cyberspace ‘Wild West’ but it is better conceived of as a way of using internet networks 
that allow for anonymous hosting and communication.  Cryptomarkets combine the darknet 
with peer-to-peer payment systems such as bitcoin, litecoin, darkcoin and dogecoin, 
allowing for goods and services to be transacted using a public ledger or ‘blockchain’. The 
cryptomarkets form a partially ‘lean’ infrastructure. They have limited techno-social features 
such as simple reputation systems, but within a much more sophisticated and rich 
anonymising infrastructure (Hine, 2015). Technical and social anonymity are pervasive 
features of the darknet. Users aim to be anonymous from each other and from the prying 
eyes of internet service providers, law enforcement agencies and other surveillance bodies. 
Cryptomarkets are often framed as the product of a few geeks and some devilish 
entrepreneurs. However, that focus on their technical and entrepreneurial achievements 
misses out how these markets came into being as a result of a combination of the 
technologies with structural conditions. These were the changes in illicit market structures 
and the meshing of illicit and licit economies called deviant globalisation (Gilman, 
Goldhammer, & Weber, 2011).  
This is an area where anonymity is a pressing issue. Those who use the darknet see it as the 
price of admission.  It is commonly presented as a technical problem.  Cryptomarket users 
are presented as being engaged in a technical game of cat and mouse with law enforcement 
and each other. However, both aspects of this miss out the way in which anonymity is 
created and maintained as a social activity, and also the crucial interface between darknet 
systems and real life.  Moving on somewhat from anonymity as a technical challenge, we 
want to highlight it as a way of engaging and maintaining social relationships on the 
darknet. We examined how important anonymity was to cryptomarket users; how they 
established and maintained anonymity; threats to anonymity; and how market relationships 
and reputations were maintained. The markets offer an additional social context that gives 
users an opportunity to find and share information in what they regard as a safer 
environment.  
Methods 
This paper is part of an ongoing project researching how drug users and vendors make use 
of the darknet (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2015). The project studies the darknet as a new 
context of drug use with its own attitudes and shared practices (Duff, 2007). Anonymity is a 
fundamental feature of how cryptomarkets are constructed technically, as markets, and as 
communities.  It cuts across several infrastructures: the technical coding of market systems, 
the software tools used by vendors, buyers and administrators, the interaction norms of the 
market user forums, the interface between the market and the postal systems used for drug 
delivery, and the security practices of users. We aimed to understand how users maintained 
anonymity while navigating the markets and interacting with other users and vendors.  
We had a two-stage data collection process. First, the discussion forum for what was a 
major cryptomarket, which we have christened ‘Merkat’, was accessed. The market has at 
the time of writing been suspended and is no longer in operation (April 2016). Permission to 
research was requested from the administrator but no reply was received after one month. 
As the forum rules did not bar researchers, and the forum was public, we decided to 
continue with the data collection. We lurked in the forum from March-May 2015 and 
manually copied forum threads into a database using the qualitative data indexing 
programme Nvivo.  The database consisted of 152 threads, ranging from 20 to 7,000 posts 
each. Forum data covered the two-year period from the market’s creation. We also 
recruited five interviewees using the personal connections of both authors and snowball 
sampling. Interviews were conducted both in person and by using video and secure 
encrypted chat methods. We sought to meet interviewees’ concerns about their anonymity. 
This often took the form of using technical anonymity to underscore social anonymity. 
Although the number of interviewees was small, the interviews allowed us to collect rich 
data about how they approached and used the darknet.  
Analysis was conducted iteratively, using a developing coding framework structured around 
emerging themes. In total 5,723 text elements were coded using automated and hand-
coding. Codes covered market structures and processes, buyer and vendor comportment on 
forums, anonymising practices, trust, interfaces between systems, surveillance and law 
enforcement activities. Using both data collection methods allowed us to explore a much 
greater range of ways of using the darknet. In particular, forum users tend to be more active 
and serious about security. Interviewees were more of a range, from those who were more 
heavily involved in using the darknet and thought a great deal about anonymity to the more 
casual and infrequent users who relied more on the darknet working for them to protect 
their identity. In line with the norms of the cryptomarkets we have paraphrased forum data 
to ensure user accounts cannot be identified through searching. We sought to reflect users’ 
norms and expectations in our own practice in both research and writing up (Association of 
Internet Researchers, 2012). User names and interview names are pseudonyms. 
The satisfactions of the hidden 
Cryptomarket users build a secure space in which they can experience a more satisfactory 
and controlled means of interacting in the drug market. There are benefits of use in terms of 
security, quality and the reduction in need for violence (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2014). 
A consistent admonishment on the forum was not to mistake social anonymity for technical 
anonymity. The latter needed continual curation. The technology is used as a means to 
avoid violence and personal risk but it is also used to engage with others in a more palatable 
way. Cryptomarket sales and interactions do not have face-to-face contact but may, 
because of technical and social anonymity, allow for types of exchanges users are not able 
to have or find more difficult in offline markets. This social space allows for an atypical set of 
relationship constructions. The social context of market performance and subcultural capital 
required to buy drugs on cryptomarkets is different from offline modes of purchasing or 
acquiring drugs. Emphasis is placed on digital competence, speed, stealth and 
responsiveness, in a context where anonymity does not mean there is no accountability. 
Many forum discussions concerned security and its potential breaches. Users and vendors 
compared notes and discussed stealth. Vendors were rated on their stealthiness and this 
was the basis for many discussions. We asked interviewees to describe the whole process 
from initial exploration through purchasing and delivery. Interviewees gave detailed 
accounts of how they went about using the darknet and their motivations for using it.  
Forum discussions were only one place where information about anonymity was exchanged. 
Related clearnet sites such as reddit hosted extensive discussions of security and users 
frequently posted warnings and advice there. As well as these practical orientations, users 
gain personal satisfaction from successfully using the darknet while maintaining anonymity 
and vendors show their customer service quality by engaging in security signalling. 
The role of forum administrators in managing relationships between participants was 
contested. They would block and ban individuals from engaging in forum communications 
for various real and alleged transgressions (Holt, Smirnova, Chua, & Copes, 2015). Some 
users alleged that many of these actions were motivated by personal interest rather than a 
desire to protect the integrity of the market. Forums facilitated ‘nested support systems’ 
that provide a place for information exchange, connections with other users and mutual 
support from those that have or have experienced similar difficulties (Van Hout & Bingham, 
2013b). Less experienced users are able to benefit from forum sections that have ‘how to’ 
instructions, and it is possible to find out which vendors have better products or more 
secure packaging (Martin, 2014). 
Interviewees recalled discovering and becoming involved with the darknet as a moment 
when their technical skills could be used. The recognition of the darknet as a potentially 
risky place was acknowledged as a challenge that could be overcome by using the right 
combination of trust practices and checks. Scamming was expected, but in practice it was 
more common for consignments to go astray than for users to fall victim to scam vendors or 
sites. 
Well I was always interested in things like bitcoin and then I found out 
about Tor and things like that expanded like the knowledge base of it and 
then I found out just how open it was. I went onto the hidden wiki which is 
a site which used to document loads of Onion [Tor] sites. That’s dead now, 
that’s been hacked, so it’s just loads of scam sites now which I found out to 
my cost. They had this huge list of things like, you could get people 
assassinated on the internet …  I mean it’s not something I’m interested in 
but wow [laugh], it’s the knowledge that you can. So yeah, I gravitated 
towards like, hey I could get my weed really cheap delivered to me from 
the Europe. And yeah ended up getting into it from there. Interviewee ‘Al’ 
Interviewees and forum users described the personal satisfaction that came from avoiding 
surveillance and showing one’s digital nous. Interacting with others online can allow for 
membership of a subculture without the risk of stigma or exposure that might be associated 
with the related activity in a more visible setting (Adler and Adler 2008). Users who were 
sufficiently savvy and confident could take on a technology management role where their 
skills were acknowledged by others. They mediate and broker the street-cryptomarket 
relationship. One interviewee did this by selling his digital skills to local dealers, another by 
using them for social supply. 
We suggest that the type of activity made possible by darknet hidden services is best 
conceived of as not being limited to specific instances of law breaking or interactions with 
others online. Rather, darknet markets and forums provide technically proficient users with 
another space in which to exist socially, a different outlet for interactions that are made 
difficult or impossible by their circumstances when not online. It provides space for a 
community of technically skilled individuals to thrive.  
Technical anonymity hinges on an empirical question: is it possible for someone to connect 
a darknet user’s activity to their legal identity? If the answer is ‘no’ then they have technical 
anonymity, if they can be then they do not have technical anonymity – a binary outcome. 
With social anonymity, the user’s own perception of being anonymous is determined by a 
combination of factors. The extent of the user’s technical knowledge and skill will determine 
how well they combine various anonymising techniques and software applications to avoid 
detection. One interviewee had used cryptomarkets with someone else guiding the main 
technical elements, and reflected on how the techniques involved had to be continually re-
learnt and shared with others in order to be sure of their effectiveness: 
The fact that you’re giving people your address over the internet to buy 
class A drugs is also something I wouldn’t want to do without fully 
understanding how it works. And then also hiding your IP [internet 
protocol] address, because you know that government, governments and 
stuff like that are monitoring these sites like you know that they are 
monitoring the traffic, let’s not lie about that. And so you want to be able 
to hide your IP and stuff like that effectively and know you’ve hidden it well 
and I would just be relying on what I’d read on the internet basically to 
understand that I’d hidden myself well enough and I don’t feel that’s good 
enough. Interviewee ‘Sel’ 
More experienced users are more likely to feel secure in their methods to ensure security 
and to enjoy the benefits of being able to engage with likeminded people. When users 
experience social anonymity, they are able to engage in the forums without the inhibitions 
experienced when fearing the exposure of information that will lead to social stigma or self-
incrimination.  
Attesting persona 
Users have personas without being identifiable. Vendors benefit from establishing 
consistent but disguised personae. The expectation that users who wish to buy and sell on 
the darknet maintain a consistency of behaviour and etiquette towards other users shows 
the difference from what might be expected from a large face-to-face criminal marketplace. 
Though a vendor will strive to completely separate their profile from their legal identity and 
‘public’ life, the markets are structured so that trust is built up through user reviews. Buyers 
expect sellers to live up to the records of their previous transactions recorded prominently 
on each vendor’s profile and in the associated discussion forums. Darknet market users try 
and ascertain the consistency and continuity of the vendor’s identity. In this instance, the 
continuity of a persona and its ‘attestability’ by others is key to acceptability and 
trustworthiness. Well-known vendors would establish themselves across different markets 
and market administrators would allow for this by reserving the usernames of well-known 
vendors when a new site was created. Administrators would pre-register them and allow 
them to transfer their feedback to the new site. Good vendors would have an entourage of 
users on the site attesting to their reliability. Buyers use sites like reddit and Grams that 
aggregate and index across different markets. 
Multiple identities are a challenge for users and vendors: 
Lol, it must be a mess having to keep up these shills [false accounts], you 
chubby little loser. Perhaps I could call you out with your Christian name? Or 
get the cops? Have you worked out how I am yet, wanker? No chance – you 
don’t recognize your own mug in the mirror. Forum user ‘vphelps’. 
Holding multiple personas across different markets could be interpreted benignly. Having 
several in the same market was thought to be suspicious and the act of scammers, fake 
vendors and hostile vendors producing smack talk about rival vendors. So although 
anonymity was prized, singularity was as well – in the sense of vendors having a single, 
pseudonymous identity with which they could be held to account. Users valued having one 
voice and one chain of responsibility. 
The salience of anonymity varied among users. Some users had an active, ‘total’ approach to 
anonymity and would for example use anonymising methods when viewing clearnet sites 
that hosted information about the darknet. Others took a more relaxed approach and 
assumed that much of the work was done for them by the market itself and the software 
they used to access it. Anonymising was both practical and a moral norm, as shown by the 
response to its opposite. Doxxing is when a person’s anonymous online persona is linked 
with their real world identity and address. Some vendors make threats of doxxing but this is 
mostly seen as beyond the moral norms of the community and akin to snitching. Partial 
doxxing could be a threat: 
I know that was an over-reaction but I had run out of options. This user has 
been trying to wreck my reputation. Merkat forum mods wouldn’t do anything. 
So I let the person know that I had his full address and he should drop it. I never 
gave out their complete doxx despite what the Merkat mods say. I just gave out 
part of their phone number – nothing that would doxx them. Vendor ‘Pigtime’. 
On the one hand doxxing is forbidden. On the other, forum users will claim a knowledge of a 
vendor's real world identity to call out scammers. One approach was to identify the vendor 
consistently through these different personae without doxxing them.  Doxxing was 
technically possible for vendors and market administrators, however it was a rare 
occurrence. The threat of doxxing to community social anonymity was greater than any 
passing benefit from doxxing an individual.  
Maintaining opsec through defeat and deniability 
The total process for securing transactions on the darknet was ‘opsec’ (operational security). 
As forum users often reminded each other, opsec was active, not passive. Using the right 
software on its own would not guarantee functioning opsec. Vendors had to apply opsec 
principles to the parts of the supply chain that were in their control. It could easily be 
compromised. Sloppy practices included using the same username in darknet and clearnet 
sites, and using clearnet email addresses for darknet transactions.  Buyers of smaller 
amounts felt freer to opt-in to some opsec practices. 
We have sorted the techniques used by cryptomarket users into two: technical defeat and 
socio-legal deniability. Defeat techniques are the kind of encryption, stealthing and evasion 
that shields them from the gaze of law enforcement.  ‘Tumbling’ bitcoin to ensure it was not 
traceable is a technique of defeat. Without tumbling, users can be traced through the 
blockchain if another part of the transaction is compromised. It is a form of money 
laundering, and could be done through a service like Bitcoin Fog that effectively creates a 
break in the chain through which users can transfer funds to different wallets to pay 
vendors, or payment can be transferred directly to the vendor’s wallet. Some users saw it as 
overkill for the casual buyer. 
There was a sense among more involved users that defeat on its own was inadequate. As Al 
pointed out, there were too many potential security holes: 
Everyone would view reddit through Tor or something so unless they are 
an idiot of course … There are other mechanisms for them to track you, 
using cookies or javascript that could be used to track you. But if you're on 
something like Tails [an anonymous computer operating system], that’s 
automatically blocked anyway. So if someone was to view it on it, even 
through Tor, they would still be trackable, even if you maximise the screen 
then the website can tell the resolution of your monitor ... So you can't 
have anything maximised, ever. So they would know exactly the size of the 
screen, right ‘someone viewed this with a resolution of this, you had a 
resolution of X, so we have reason to believe that was you’. And obviously 
that's not going to work on its own, you need other evidence but that is 
circumstantial. There's actually a specific warning when you go to 
maximize a window on Tails, it says ‘hey maybe not’. Interviewee ‘Al’ 
Ideally PGP encryption is used when sending buyers’ addresses to vendors – so it should not 
be linked to the purchase directly through the market. When vendors are arrested, 
suspicion is expressed on reddit that they may have kept buyers’ details. In contrast, some 
users were very relaxed about opsec, using their own computers with a mainstream 
operating system, Tor, and having drugs delivered to their home address. The different 
approaches our interviewees took demonstrated the performative aspect of anonymising, 
where being fully in control of one’s own digital trail was a pleasure in itself. 
Deniability is a way of engineering interactions that involves severing personal legal 
responsibility for drug shipments and introducing plausible deniability. For example, using a 
false name for deliveries and scrubbing stored addresses is a technique of deniability, as is 
wording messages in a deliberately vague way.   
[Discussion of secure email systems] I’ve been told that particular server 
has been infiltrated by the NSA [US National Security Agency] as well. To 
be safe always avoid the kind of words that might trigger a search. I make 
sure I’m VERY vague in emails. Forum user ‘Hilarysgusset’ 
Much of the discussion around security on the darknet focuses on techniques of defeat.  
However, arrests are more likely to happen because of failures of deniability: being caught 
with large quantities of drugs clearly destined for consignment, making large cash 
purchases, having others give evidence leading to a warrant and so on.  
Defeat on the vendor’s side involves stealth. Good stealth is an important measure of 
vendor quality. Shipping in good ‘cover’, such as a DVD case or another innocuous item, is 
praised, as is having a legitimate-looking return address. The more the package appears to 
be a plausible shipment from an online retailer the better. Vacuum sealing, use of moisture 
barrier bags, and good practice such as cleaning vacuum seals, are commented on. Good 
stealth is held to go right through the supply chain and involves the vendor using 
untraceable systems when paying for postage. The technique of defeat is also key here, 
ensuring no link in the chain of identification will lead back to the vendor.  
The inadequate shield of technology  
Two technology backbones underpin the cryptomarkets. The internet backbone – the 
system of routers and cabling connecting the different hosts around the world – and the 
global postal system. Each could link the users to their real world identities in various ways 
and vendor and user opsec was crucial in stopping this from happening. Successful use of 
the technology was a combination of the right hardware, software and good practice.  There 
were a set of technologies and infrastructures involved, from specialised software, burner 
phones and the postal service. Encryption which scrambles the data packets being sent via 
the internet backbone is the magic invisibility cloak that ‘noobs’ (new, inexperienced users) 
are constantly being reminded about on the forum.  
The first time as a vendor was on Evolution. I set up a simple vendor page, not 
much on there because I didn’t think much needed to be said. After the first few 
orders were sent in unencypted I told the buyers never to do that. I put a post in 
all my listings – use PGP or don’t order. It was amazing how many people don’t 
bother with the simplest encryption. Vendor ‘diamondsogs’ 
However anonymity is not synonymous with encryption. Embedded metadata in a 
document can reveal much about its author. Data embedded in photos records the camera 
type, date, time and often the location unless this metadata is stripped out or not recorded 
in the first place (Julian, 2015). Frequently using the right technology could lead to lax real 
world security practice. Real world security holes were neglected as long as the person 
thought they had got the digital security set up correctly.  
Bitcoin is often represented as a technology of anonymity. Unlike Tor it is not designed for 
anonymity, but it does permit it (Reid & Harrigan, 2013).  Various techniques and practices 
have to be applied to make bitcoin anonymous. The first possible identity leak is at the point 
of converting government backed fiat currency such as British sterling or the US dollar into 
cryptocurrency. Law enforcement can follow the blockchain and monitor large transactions 
that can then be matched up with darknet users using brute force data matching. One 
method of de-linking is to use local bitcoin: 
[Bitcoin vendor] picked me up, drove to another cafe, bought a pot of tea 
while we had a little chat about Bitcoin and the general crypto-economy 
and all that jazz because the transfer was taking a while to come through. 
The transfer came through, and there was a verification code that I knew 
but he wouldn’t get until he had sent the coins and the transaction had 
been confirmed. So he then showed me the code and they matched up 
with one that I already had, so I knew the Bitcoins had been transferred 
successfully. And I was able to go home. Interview ‘Al’ 
There is a theatre of security aspect to some of the precautions taken by interviewees, 
vendors and forum users, where anonymising activities become ritualised (Amoore & Hall, 
2010). Security practices are part of the expected comportment when interacting with the 
market. There is similarity with the legal security market (Loader, Goold, & Thumala, 2015). 
Many of the techniques used are part of security signalling. Security measures by vendors 
are a signal of the vendor's reliability and professionalism. Those who did not work opsec 
throughout the supply chain were seen as amateurish. Security signalling is part of the 
theatre of security that has become a common part of social life in many societies. Public 
and private security services engage in a variety of techniques that signal that they are 
taking security seriously. As security has become privatised and spread throughout society, 
these theatres of security are becoming more common (Schreier & Caparini, 2005).  Darknet 
vendors adopted security signalling as mark of vendor and product quality. In addition to 
signalling, personal pride and social status can come from successfully handling the layered 
systems of encryption and anonymisation. Rituals of anonymising could also be seen as 
disrupting the normalised, ritualised surveillance which has been embedded in the fabric of 
social life (Bajc, 2007). In these ways, anonymity becomes a resource for both sellers and 
buyers, who use it to signal quality, trustworthiness and competence. 
Discussion 
Various implementations of encryption are presented as troublesome technologies that 
encourage a dangerous anonymity that is corrosive of the social order. As we have shown, 
this misrepresents both the history of those technologies and how they are used today. 
Treating anonymity as inherently suspicious brushes aside critical perspectives that point to 
government mandated publicity of individual identities and behaviours as a tool of social 
control (Cobb, 2007), which are features of new forms of governance that target conduct 
(Flint & Nixon, 2006), and to the ethics of cryptography (Rogaway, 2015). There is also a long 
history of anonymising practices and technologies being tools with a political purpose 
(O’Brien, 2001; Williams, 1986). We started with the argument that anonymity, often 
presented as a kind of withdrawal from social life is through and through a form of social 
engagement (Marx, 1999). It severs the relationship between one persona and others and 
allows them to vary and adapt to different arenas (Shilling & Mellor, 2015). It is not easy to 
attain and maintain anonymity online. Supposedly anonymised individuals can be de-
anonymised using metadata with relative ease (Ohm, 2010) or through the normal workings 
of internet service providers. Currently there are concerted attempts by some states and 
corporations to collapse multiple online personas into one traceable identity. However, 
users’ deniability practices can disrupt de-anonymising techniques (Spitter, Klaver, Koot, & 
van Staalduinen, 2015).  
As well as challenging the representation of anonymity as deceitful, we also challenge the 
representation of its opposite as trustworthy. Various governments have sought to establish 
the measure of trust as the permanence and openness to surveillance of an individual’s 
identity. Governments and private actors seek to link individuals’ online personae with their 
offline identity. These developments are part of the generalisation and privatisation of 
surveillance and securitisation of everyday life. More and more private organisations are 
expected to be involved in immigration control, tracking and monitoring extremism and so 
on. Though this has been represented as privatisation, it might be better to call it 
nationalisation of the internet and associated technologies by various states from China to 
Russia. There is a tension in the online world between requirements that users are 
consistently traceable to a singular, real world self, and encouraging users to adopt multiple 
identities. We can then question the classical sociological assumption that there is a one to 
one mapping between ‘self’ and ‘identity’ when dealing with multiple, fluid selves.  
In contrast to users of the clearnet (Viseu, Clement, & Aspinall, 2004), our respondents are 
concerned to hide their activities and identities. This presents a new set of problems in 
establishing trust. Instead of achieving trust through connecting to a real world identity, the 
measure of trust is the attestibility and continuity of the online persona. For many darknet 
users, the ability to remain anonymous is a form of resistance. Mostly, the anonymity of the 
darknet was not deceitful. Anonymity does not preclude developing social relationships and 
mutual support between buyers and vendors. In this article we have highlighted the growing 
politics of anonymity, through one setting where anonymity is an expected feature of 
interaction. Anonymity produces some challenges for users in maintaining trust, however it 
is not fundamentally debilitating. Anonymity at first sight potentially challenges some 
assumptions about social life, particularly the one-to-one mapping of personal, legal and 
moral accountability.  However darknet users were keen to maintain a consistent identity. 
This was necessary for vendor and customer reputation and ensuring trust (Vickery, 2015). 
Public discussion of anonymity is dominated by privacy related concerns over surveillance, 
and the uses of anonymity as a shield for harmful behaviour. Both of these perspectives see 
anonymity as an individual quality, that disrupts the connection between online and offline 
personas. We have discussed a setting where anonymity is used to create lateral 
connections between individuals. It allows for community to be performed and stigma to be 
challenged. We do not wish to downplay the problems caused to individuals and online 
communities by unaccountable negative behaviour and malicious internet traffic originating 
in the darknet. However, we challenge the assumption that technical anonymity is the prime 
facilitator of this behaviour, and that the way to stop it is to de-anonymise the darknet. 
Doing so would damage the interests of minority communities and contribute to the general 
decline of privacy in contemporary life on- and off-line. 
While not exactly comparable, evidence from peer-to-peer file-sharing suggests that well-
publicised threats of deanonymisation and prosecutions have only a limited deterrent effect 
on illicit behaviour of this kind, instead leading users to develop more sophisticated 
techniques and technologies to remain hidden (Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008). In a similar 
way, what was central in our study was how the cryptomarket vendors and buyers 
combined technology, opsec and interaction norms to maintain a hidden community. It is 
also the case that despite its significance in public discussion of the darknet anonymity is not 
a necessary condition for online drug trading (Watters & Phair, 2012) and many forms of 
drug trading go on using the internet, and especially social media, without those involved 
going to great lengths to disguise their real world identities from each other or possible 
third parties. Indeed, the darknet receives a significant amount of attention from law 
enforcement agencies and is far from being impenetrable. Being part of a hidden 
community on the darknet provided benefits that went beyond being able to buy and sell 
drugs in relative security. Vendors and buyers preferred its greater predictability and 
accountability, and the fact that it allowed them to demonstrate and be acknowledged for 
interpersonal, professional and technical skills in way that was difficult or impossible in face 
to face or open internet drug exchanges.   
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